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ABSTRACT
This study examines constituent participation in the accounting standards set-
ting  process in Canada to determine whether the positions of  auditors and
their clients relative to new accounting standards proposals are independent of
each other. Using responses to the ten accounting exposure drafts receiving the
highest public responses, the active role of Big Eight (now Big Five) firms is
underscored. For all responses, significant agreement between Big Eight/Five
auditors and their clients in their respective positions on proposed new
accounting standards is found. However, domination of the process by  Big
Eight/Five firms through indirect influence of their clients’ responses to indi-
vidual exposure drafts is not supported. Disagreements among Big Eight /Five
firms and between Big Eight/Five firms  and their clients are found. Overall test
results indicate that relative to the core issues on which new accounting stan-
dards are needed, auditors and their clients generally respond independently,
even if  there were some new proposals on which they had the same views. The
findings suggest that independent corporate and audit-firm motivations explain
the decision to participate in the accounting standards setting process. The real
motivations for the active participation in the process by auditors and corpo-
rations are subjects for continued research.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the 1970s, the then Big Eight (now Big Five) accounting firms have
been perceived  to dominate the accounting standards setting processes in the
US, Canada and elsewhere through their size, dominance of other accounting
firms, and big share of the large corporate clients market. Although the
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) has the sole authority to
issue accounting and auditing standards in Canada, it still uses a due process for
standard setting,  much like that of the Financial Accounting Standards  Board
(FASB), which is not the final authority on accounting standards in the United
States of America. During the 1970s the CICA was mailing out about 40,000
copies of each new exposure draft to its members and subscribers of its
Handbook for comments. However, from 1981, distribution was cut by 80% to
only about 6,800 people per exposure draft. The reduced distribution was due
to the poor response rates to the earlier exposure drafts. It was also not until the
1980s that the CICA started compiling booklet forms of the exposure draft and
its related responses into what it calls the Public Record. The first public record
issued was in 1984 for the 1983 exposure draft on Investment Tax Credit.  By
1996, 52 public records had been issued. Since then, exposure drafts have
received wider circulation through publication in the CA Magazine and  on the
internet. 
Against this backdrop, this study examines participation in the Canadian
accounting standards setting  process to determine whether auditors influence
their clients’ responses and positions relative to new accounting standards pro-
posals. It highlights the role of relevant parties which, given the limited distri-
bution environment prior to 1996, were interested in the outcome of potential
accounting standards enough to participate in the process. Efforts to increase
participation can be directed at areas with minimal participation. Furthermore,
an understanding of the various constituents will permit studies on their
participation motivations. If the process is being patronized by a limited domi-
nant group, then further examination of their real influences can be examined.
Finally, the study extends examination of constituent participation in account-
ing standards setting in the accounting literature into the Canadian context.
BACKGROUND AND PRIOR RESEARCH 
The CICA’s involvement in developing accounting principles began in
1946, when it issued its first recommendation in the form of a bulletin. Several
bulletins followed until all bulletins were reorganized into the CICA Handbook
in 1968 (Baylin et al, 1996). The formalization of the role of the CICA as the
standard setter of accounting for the wider business community began in 1972
when the Canadian Securities Commission made compliance with the CICA
Handbook recommendations a requirement for all publicly trading firms
(Murphy, 1980). The federal government gave its support to the Handbook in
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1975 when the Canada Business Corporations Act required the financial state-
ments filings by firms incorporated under the Act to be in accordance with the
CICA Handbook (Baylin et al, 1996). Soon afterwards several provincial
governments passed similar compliance laws for firms incorporated under
provincial jurisdiction. These actions “essentially granted the CICA a monop-
oly for accounting standards setting in Canada” (Falk, 1988, 29). 
The CICA’s due process in accounting standards setting involves:  (1)
review of research proposals,  (2) project proposal, (3) statement of principles,
(4) exposure draft,  (5) significant changes (re-exposure draft), and (6) CICA
handbook recommendations or shelving of project. Constituent participation
occurs during the exposure draft stage. Tandy and Wilburn (1992) see the due
process or participation in the standard setting process as necessary to ensure
the legitimacy of the standards setting authority. Since acceptance of the stan-
dards depends partly on the perceived legitimacy of the standard setting author-
ity, due process procedures help to create  the perception of legitimacy,  help
prevent standards that are unworkable, overly costly, or even inconsistent with
basic concepts, and provide a formal systematic approach to problem solving
and standards setting. In the Canadian context, due process may be necessary
not only to preserve the integrity of the process but also to ward off possible
government intervention.
Prior research has identified the motivations for lobbying on accounting
standards to include (a) the advantage to be gained from a favourable outcome
(resulting standard is the preferred outcome desired by the lobbyist), and (b) the
preservation of  private control of the standard-setting process (Tandy and
Wilburn, 1992; Sutton, 1984). The only research work on the influence of large
accounting firms on the standard setting process in the United States by Puro
(1985), found no support for large firm domination of the process although they
participated more often. There have also been several studies providing
descriptive information on constituent participation in standards setting in the
US, Australia, and the UK, but no such studies exist in the Canadian context.
For example, Nakayama et al. (1981) noted the low level of responses from all
respondent groups, notably, public accounting, academicians and financial ana-
lysts to the FASB’s exposure draft on leases, while Mezias and Chung (1989)
found for 30 randomly selected FASB exposure drafts that financial statement
preparers wrote more letters than all other groups combined. This study intro-
duces a Canadian perspective to the literature on constituent participation in the
accounting setting process.
The work of Gravens et al. (1989) on Australian companies provides
additional insights into the decision to participate. They found that larger com-
panies participate to a greater extent  than smaller companies in the Australian
standard setting process. They posited that this could be due to participation
costs being relatively smaller for larger firm and the tendency of larger firms to
have  formal procedures for participation. 
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Other studies have investigated the decision to participate in the standard
setting process in the context of the economic consequences of accounting
choices. Thus, the decision to lobby is investigated through the relationship
between firm characteristics and their disposition towards accounting choice
through the use of standard political and economic consequences hypotheses
advanced in the positive accounting literature (e.g. Watts and Zimmerman
1990, Holthausen 1990 and Morhrman 1993) as potential explanators of many
types of accounting choices. This approach was used by Arcelus and Trenholm
(1991) and Abekah et al. (1999) in the Canadian context.  There is some evi-
dence in these studies of a relationship between the decision to lobby and eco-
nomic incentive variables.
While a number of studies, especially the economic consequences stud-
ies, focus on one constituent group, this study follows Tandy and Wilburn
(1992) in first examining the participation of all constituent groups, and then
Puro (1985) by examining the presence, if any, of auditor-client dependence in
the standards setting process in Canada.
DATA
The CICA’s public records form the data sources for the analysis in this
study. All public records that were available at the end of 1996 relating to finan-
cial accounting standards  were examined. The public record includes the expo-
sure draft, the written comments received, and the final recommendation, if
any.  By 1996, fifty two public records had been prepared. Unlike the FASB,
the CICA does not provide a breakdown of responses by constituent groups.
Each response letter, therefore,  had to be reviewed to determine its appropri-
ate constituency. Of the 3487 responses to the 52 exposure drafts covered in the
public records, 39 were anonymous, leaving usable responses of 3448. Twenty-
one of the fifty-two exposure drafts were accounting recommendations, twen-
ty-one dealt with auditing recommendations, and ten dealt with government
and non-profit issues. There were 1922 responses (23 of them anonymous)
related to the accounting recommendations,  1039 responses (8 anonymous)
related to auditing, and 526 responses (8 anonymous) to the government and
non-profit exposure drafts. For the purpose of examining the role of large
accounting firms and their clients in the process, the ten accounting exposure
drafts receiving the highest responses were used.  The definition of constituen-
cies by the FASB as “all who have an interest in financial accounting  and
reporting” is used in this study. Constituencies, identified from reviewing the
response letters in the fifty two Public Records are: (1)  Accountants and
Accounting Firms, (2) Provincial Accounting Bodies, (3) Government and
Security Regulators, (4)  Public Corporations,  (5) Crown Corporations,  (6)
Other Professional Organizations, (7) Academicians (8) Other Individuals, and
(9)  Banks.
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RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Table 1a  presents information about total participation relative to the
fifty-two exposure drafts. The most active constituencies were accountants and
accounting firms  (34%) and public corporations (26%). Significant participa-
tion is also observed for government and security regulators (14%), provincial
accounting bodies (10%), and other individuals (6%). When provincial
accounting bodies are combined with accountants and accounting firms, 44%
of all responses came from those directly involved in the accounting profession.
The category of exposure draft affects participation. Accountants and account-
ing firms were very active constituents in all three (accounting, auditing, not-
for-profit) exposure drafts categories. Since this group includes auditors, this
result is to be expected. Accountants should naturally be interested in account-
ing, auditing and even  government/non-profit accounting recommendations.
On the other hand, public corporations were the most active constituents on
exposure drafts dealing with new accounting reporting standards. They were
not very active on auditing recommendations and were least active on govern-
ment/non-profit related recommendations. This was also as expected as busi-
ness companies would be more interested in changes to accounting standards
for their financial reporting purposes than in auditing standards or govern-
ment/non-profit standards.
Responses to Individual Exposure Drafts
In the accounting recommendations category, 44% of the overall respons-
es were from public corporations and 27% were from accountants and account-
ing  firms. Responses to individual exposure drafts show that the subject mat-
ter of the exposure draft affects the level of participation by all groups. For
example, the responses to the exposure draft on Financial Statement Concepts
had 50% of the responses from accountants and accounting firms, while only
5.6% were from public corporations. Conversely, for the exposure draft on
Corporate Income Taxes, 60% of the responses were from public corporations
and 24% were from accountants and accounting firms. Obviously, corporations
are more interested in taxes than the theoretical ideals of financial statement
concepts. Furthermore, the corporate income taxes exposure draft attracted the
highest overall response of any of the drafts studied, at 274, while the financial
statements concepts draft attracted the lowest responses in the accounting cat-
egory.  It is also noteworthy that in the accounting and auditing categories,
accountants and their related firms and bodies account for 70% or more of the
participation in the standard setting process. This is similar to Tandy and
Wilburn (1992) study for the U.S.A. where they found a 72% concentration for
accountants and their related firms. 
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Auditor-client Dependence in the Standards Setting Process
For this part of the study, the ten exposure drafts relating to accounting
standards that attracted the most responses were used. These were the drafts on
(1) investment tax credit, (2) statement of changes in financial position (cash
flows), (3) pensions, (4) revenue recognition, (5) portfolio investments, (6)
income taxes, (7) future oriented financial statements, (8) pensions (reissued),
(9) property plant and equipment, and (10) capital assets (reissued). Auditor-
client dependence was analyzed by examining the extent of agreement or dis-
agreement between auditor and client positions on the overall standards, and on
individual standards. If a firm responded to the exposure draft, its auditor also
had to have responded for it to be used in the analysis. Only clients of Big Eight
/Big Five auditing  firms were used for this analysis because only those  Big
Eight /Big Five firms responded frequently enough to have enough samples for
the  analysis. Response positions on the core issue(s) of the new standards
being proposed were categorized as yes or no. These responses were then used
in contingency tables for Chi-Square tests of independence to be performed.
The results are reported in Table 2.
The results indicate that for the ten exposure drafts studied as a whole,
client and auditor responses were not independent of each other. There was sig-
nificant agreement between the responses of auditors and their clients. On indi-
vidual exposure draft basis, however, the hypothesis of independence could not
be rejected for all but the exposure draft on corporate income taxes. Here, the
result indicates that auditors and their clients had the same disposition towards
the proposed exposure draft on taxes. The same could be said for auditor/client
positions on the statement of changes in financial position (cash flow) on which
auditors and their clients were in agreement 92% of the times. There is no Chi-
Square test result because of the zeroes in two cells of the contingency table for
that exposure draft.  While the test of independence on an individual exposure
draft basis is largely insignificant, Tables 1b and 1e show that majority of
responding corporations had the same disposition towards the core issues of the
proposal in eight out of the ten exposure drafts used for the analysis. This may
partly explain why the overall results indicates dependence, although on an
individual exposure draft basis, significant dependence is largely found to be
absent. If auditors influence their clients’ responses, would it be that they make
their positions on the standards known first and try to get their clients on board?
Further review of the response letters (Table 1b section 3) again indicates that
clients overall responded first to the exposure drafts under review in seven out
of ten cases.  What is evident from these results is that the decision to respond
to the issues raised in new exposure drafts is made by respondents irrespective
of their relationship with other prospective respondents to the same exposure
drafts. The perception of Big Eight/Five auditors’ domination also arises from
the fact that they are seen to be too involved in the process. Naturally, because
of the nature of their work and better understanding of the theories, techniques,
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and practical issues surrounding accounting proposals, they are bound to indi-
cate their stance on issues they understand better more often than other users.
This is borne out by their active participation in the standards setting process
from Table 1b, section 1 and Table 1c. They participate more often than other
accounting firms. However, the Big Eight/Five accounting firms were not often
unanimous in their dispositions towards the proposals as seen in Table 1d. That
they may influence other participants to tow their line of thought relative to new
standards is not empirically evident in this study. Indeed the significant simi-
larities in responses of auditors and their clients to the exposure draft on income
taxes and the statement of changes in financial position (cash flow statement)
may be best explained by the nature of the subject matter of those proposed
standards themselves. The draft contents could arouse similar responses from
auditors and their clients rather than by any attempt at collusion between audi-
tors and their clients to influence the outcomes of eventual standards.
CONCLUSION
The intention behind the use of due process in accounting standards set-
ting is to bring the views of many interested users of accounting information to
bear on the eventual standards. It is expected that this would ensure greater
acceptance of eventual standards and help to avoid the costs of enforcement
that may, otherwise, be high. Hence the process is being used in Canada even
though the CICA has sole authority over the issuing of standards to be followed
by publicly traded companies. The empirical evidence presented in this study
indicates that there is broad audience participation in the standard setting
process in Canada  although accountants, accounting firms and their related
organizations are the most prominent ones, just as they are in the USA and
elsewhere.  Also, evidence of the large auditing firms  additionally influencing
the process through their clients is not indicated by the results of this study,
especially on an individual exposure draft by exposure draft basis. When all
responses were grouped together without regard to the exposure draft, the test
of independence of auditor-client response was rejected. However, that was an
inadequate determinant of auditor-client dependence since the ultimate goal of
auditors’ attempt at influencing their clients would be to influence the outcome
of individual standards. Hence it can be concluded from the results of this study
that the nature of responses is not easily predictable. Furthermore, independent
firm and corporate motivations explain the decision to participate in the
accounting standards setting process in Canada to a significant extent. There
may be other reasons for this to happen as well.  
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